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Abstract 
Perception of Burmese Buddhism by the Western world since 1988 has been largely 
associated with pacifism and democracy through the leader of the opposition and the Nobel 
Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi. However, the current Rohingya refugee crisis is 
changing that positive perception. The aim of the following presentation is to analyze the 
contemporary conflict between Muslims and Buddhist nationalists in Burma. To get a deeper 
understanding of the problem, it is essential to connect it with Burma’s pre-colonial and 
colonial past as well as the country’s ethnic diversity. Radicalization of the attitudes of 
Theravada Buddhists and the rise of xenophobic sentiments in Burma are connected with 
Burmese national identity, which is largely based on ethnicity and tends to exclude the rest, 
including Muslims. However, due to historical, cultural and cosmological differences, Islam 
especially is a target. The aim of the paper is to explain why Myanmar’s Islamophobia has 
its roots in Buddhist nationalism and why opposition to Islam is a part of it. 
Keywords: Buddhism nationalism, Buddhism and violence, Islam in Myanmar, minorities 
in Myanmar, Political science of religion 
 
Introduction 
The international discovery of Buddhist monks’ involvement in anti-
Muslim riots in Rakhine State in Burma1 came as a surprise. Buddhism 
in this country had until then been largely associated with the peaceful 
pro-democracy demonstrations of 2007 (the Saffron Revolution) and the 
famous dissident, Nobel Peace Prize winner, Aung San Suu Kyi 2 . 
																																								 																				
* Institute of Religious Studies, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland 
(roman.husarski@uj.edu.pl) 
1 I use alternately: Burma and Myanmar.  
2 Many of the journalists connected her Buddhism with advocating for 
democracy. Some compared her also with Dalai Lama or Thich Nhat Hanh; A. Clements, 
Aung San Suu Kyi, Aung San Suu Kyi, Voice of Hope: Conversations with Alan Clements, 
New York: Seven Stories Press, 2008; Madeleine Bunting, Aung San Suu Kyi's idea of 
freedom offers a radical message for the west, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2011/jun/26/aungsansuukyi-spiritual-
struggle-lesson, (accessed: 26.10.2017). 
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However, critics and journalists generally described the problem of the 
violence in Buddhism as a new phenomenon. Although she was 
considered as a moral voice until recently, Aung San Suu Kyi’s lack of 
unambiguous commitment was disappointing 3 . Despite the 
development of many peaceful teachings, Buddhism is more linked with 
politics than most Westerners would think4. One could not understand 
the problem without a short historical review of this relationship. In this 
paper I will briefly describe the relationship between Islam and 
Buddhism in the Burmese kingdom during the colonial time and also in 
current times. In the context of modernity, I will focus particularly on 
the anti-Islamic activities of the Buddhist nationalists and groups 
associated with them, such as the 969 movement and MaBaTha 
(Patriotic Association of Myanmar) - which has its roots in 969.  
 
Kings and Buddhism  
It was king Anawrhata (1044-1099) who first officially adopted 
Theravada Buddhism in the 11th century as the state religion of the 
pagan kingdom and dismissed Ari Buddhism - a mixture of shamanism, 
alchemy, Hindu astrology and some Buddhist practices which one can 
categorise as tantric5. Anawrahta established a model of cosmology, 
which would have its consequences in the following centuries. Three 
important concepts were confirmed at the time: bawashin, dhammaraja, 
and cakkavattin. 
Bawashin (the lord of life) meant that the king was morally superior 
to other people, he was the master of their lives. He held authority 
because of kamma (karma) he had accumulated in previous 
incarnations, which had enabled him to become king. His unlimited 
power was logical and was a consequence of kamma. If the king was 
inequitable, the Burmese had explained it as a punishment for their evil 
and the lack of morality in society6.  
																																								 																				
3 West misunderstanding of ASSK is a topic of many Michał Lubina articles e.g. M. Lubina, 
‘It’s complicated : United States, Aung San Suu Kyi and U.S.-Burma relations’, Acta 
Asiatica Varsoviensia, No. 29, 2016, pp. 131–146. 
4 The issue was broadly explored in M. Jerryson (ed), Buddhist Warfare, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010. 
5 Maung Htin Aung, Folk-Elements in Burmese Buddhism, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1958/02/folk-elements-in-burmese-
buddhism/306833/, (accessed: 26.10.2017). 
6 M. Lubina, Pani Birmy Aung San Suu Kyi. Biografia polityczna [Aung San Suu Kyi of 
Burma. A Political Biography], Warszawa: PWN, 2015, pp. 17-20. 
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Dhammaraja7 (king of law) meant the ruler would command the 
country in accordance with the principles of Buddhism. He was 
obligated to protect religion and maintain morality. The king had to 
ensure the development of Buddhism and protect the Buddhist clergy8. 
Most often he did this by building pagodas – which is the reason why 
Burma is called to this day “the land of a thousand pagodas”. That status 
also legitimised the ruler’s conquests - he made them in order to spread 
Buddha’s teachings.  
As dhammaraja, he should also be a cakkavattin (the wheel-turner) 
- a universal king. This attitude equates the ruler to the Buddha himself, 
as one who turned the wheel of laws, dhamma. This similarity was also 
confirmed by ancient texts. In Mahāparinibbāna Sutta there is 
information that Buddha in his past lives was cakkavattin seven times. 
The Pali tradition says that perfection achieved as a king allowed him 
rebirth as the Buddha9. The role of the ruler was totalistic in the social 
and cosmic dimension. As an earthly counterpart of the Buddha, he was 
a moral foundation for the population10. His power had a self-sustaining 
internal logic. If people did not understand the decisions made by rulers, 
they could explain to themselves that as cakkavattin, they, simply, could 
see more.  
What is important is that the Burmese king and the monks had a 
symbiotic relationship. On the one hand, the monks were allowed to 
admonish the ruler if he moved away from the dhamma, and on the other 
hand there is no doubt that the king had full authority over the sangha. 
In the case of disobedience or violation of the rules of Theravada 
Buddhism, he could purify the Buddhist clergy11. In fact, monks were a 
pillar of the Burmese monarchy.  
																																								 																				
7  Dhammaraja as well as cakkavattin were notions adopted from Hindu concepts of 
kingship. 
8  M.J. Walton, Politics in the Moral Universe: Burmese Buddhist Political Thought, 
Washington: University of Washington, 2012, pp. 117-118. 
9 F.E. Reynolds, ‘The Two Wheels of the Dhamma’, in The Two Wheels of 
Dhamma: Essays on the Theravada Tradition in India and Ceylon, G. Obeyesekere, F. 
Reynolds, B.L. Smith (eds), Chambersburg: American Academy of Religious Studies 1972, 
pp. 13-15. 
10 I. Harris, Buddhism, Power and Political Order, New York: Routledge 2007, pp. 76-78. 
11 A. Naono, The Buddhist Kings of Chingmai and Pegu, The Purification of The Sangha, 
and The Mahabodhi Replicas in The Late Fifteenth Century, Michigan: University of 
Michigan 1996, pp. 5-8. 
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Theravada cosmology legitimised the absolute authority of the king. 
He was on the top of the hierarchy and was considered as more than an 
average human being12. The king and the kingdom were a unity. Atsuko 
Naono writes: “One of the most important responsibilities was also for 
the dhammaraja to provide order, political and religious, out of chaos 
and to preserve that order once accomplished”13. The Buddhist clergy 
and society as a whole were strictly hierarchical. Ordinary Burmese 
people by and large accepted their class status and believed in a better 
rebirth in the next life. The ideal way of living was realised by monks, 
who theoretically should never reincarnate again. As W. J. Koenig 
emphasises: “The institution of the Kingdom has never been questioned 
in theory or practice but was simply accepted as a necessary part of 
life”14. Many scholars agree that Burmese Theravada cosmology was a 
rather static one15. Kings tried to maintain the status quo and protect the 
dhamma from its enemies. 
 
Muslims in Burma  
This part of the paper will discuss examples of the clashes between 
the Islamic and Burmese civilisations. Pre-Burmese states (Mon, Pyu) 
are not accounted in the work. Contact with Muslims in these states 
often looked different. What is important is that Islam was rather 
incompatible with many elements of Theravada's cosmology kingdom. 
According to legend, Islam was brought to Arakan by the son of 
Imam Ali in the seventh century. Burmese Muslims believe that his 
tomb is near Maungdaw city16. Most likely, Arab and Persian merchants 
had visited the area before, but for the first time Muslims appear in the 
annals of Pegu in the eleventh century, during the reign of King 
																																								 																				
12 Some kings went even further announcing that they are a realized bodhisattva or even 
reincarnation of Buddha Maitreya.  
13 A. Naono, The Buddhist Kings…, p. 5. 
14  W.J. Koenig, The Burmese Polity, 1752-1819: A Study of Kon Baung Politics, 
Administration, and Social Organization, Ann Arbor: Centre for South and Southeast Asian 
Studies, 1990, p. 5.  
15 Par contra some scholars adjust that model, which can be considered as dynamic because 
some changes were easily assimilated by a society that was convinced of its dependent 
origination. However, the cosmological core remained the same, M.J. Walton, Politics in 
the Moral Universe: Burmese Buddhist Political Thought, Washington: University of 
Washington, 2012, pp. 8-10. 
16  Marlar Than, The origin of Islamic Religion in Myanmar, 
http://www.academia.edu/4657059/THE_ORIGIN_OF_ISLAMIC_RELIGION_IN_MYA
NMAR, (accessed: 26.10.2017). 
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Anawrahta. The ruler tried to maintain full control over religion in his 
country. By adopting Theravada, he persecuted other beliefs and 
Buddhist sects17. We find a story of two disobedient Muslims in the 
chronicles of Pegu in which two Arabs were sentenced to death after 
they refused to assist in the construction of a pagoda – a Buddhist sacred 
place18.  
However, another mention in the annals of the kingdom of Pegu is 
milder. Muslims had the knowledge, equipment and technologies that 
impressed the rulers living in the areas along the Irrawaddy River. They 
also gladly accepted merchants from all over the world including 
Muslims. For this reasons, they were allowed to settle within the 
kingdoms and sometimes were even employed by the royal courts19. For 
example, King Sawlu (1077-1088) in his youth was educated by a 
Muslim Arab20. For these reasons it can be concluded that the kings’ 
approach of the first Burmese Empire to Muslims was a very pragmatic 
one. They did not hesitate to use the achievements of other civilisations, 
yet severely punished any act of disobedience to the prevailing rules in 
the kingdom.  
The first king who openly discriminated against Muslims was 
Bayinnaung (1550-1581), founder of the Second Burmese Empire, a 
very talented leader, who, among other things, conquered Siam21. In 
1559 the ruler saw the ritual slaughter of goats on the streets of Pegu, 
which greatly upset him. Buddhism recommends refraining from killing 
all creatures. In the circle of Theravada Buddhism, butchers had 
belonged to the excluded castes and usually lived on the outskirts of the 
cities. King Bayinnaung not only banned the practice of ritual slaughter, 
halal, but also forced the Muslim community to listen to lectures on 
Buddhist morality and compassion. Later rulers also maintained the ban 
of ritual slaughter22. 
During the reign of King Bodawpaya (1782-1819), who conquered 
Arakan and was renowned for his cruelty, another incident happened. 
																																								 																				
17 M.J. Walton, Politics in…, p. 148. 
18  M. Yegar, The Muslims of Burma. A Study of a Minority Group, Wiesbaden: Otto 
Harrassowitz 1972, pp. 1-2. 
19  Marlar Than, The origin of Islamic Religion in Myanmar, 
http://www.academia.edu/4657059/THE_ORIGIN_OF_ISLAMIC_RELIGION_IN_MYA
NMAR, (accessed: 26.10.2017). 
20 M. Yegar, The Muslims…, p. 2. 
21 M. Lubina, Birma [Burma], Warszawa: Trio, 2014, p. 25. 
22 M. Yegar, The Muslims…, p. 10. 
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The ruler heard that Muslims would sooner die than corrupt themselves 
by eating pork, so he decided to give Islam a test. He summoned the 
most important Muslim dignitaries from the capital (then it was Awa), 
and set before them a bowl of pork and ordered it consumed under threat 
of death. To the present time two accounts of the event survived. The 
first comes from a British man who spent two years in a Burmese prison 
and heard a discussion about the story. This version states that the 
Muslims quietly enjoyed the meal and thus avoided death23. The second 
version, much less known, is promoted by Burmese Muslims. After 
disobeying the king, the were summoned and sentenced to death. Soon 
a terrible storm hit the city, after which the ruler regretted his decision. 
Burmese Muslims still cherish the story of the group of mujahedeen 
(martyrs) killed by the cruel king. Their alleged graves are located in 
Amarapura24. Considering the nature of the king and the situation of the 
Muslim community, it is not hard to guess which version is more likely. 
Also Bodawphaya claimed that he had conquered the kingdom of Mrauk 
U in order to protect sasana (Buddhist religion). Mrauk U, 
geographically close to Bengal, adopted many elements of Islam and 
Bodawphaya justified his actions in order to purify the land25.  
In conclusion, it should be noted that in pre-colonial Burma, 
especially before the conquest of Arakan, there were few Muslims. They 
were valued for their skills. Kings used them as interpreters (mainly 
from Persia) and they often also served in the army and in the royal 
courts. King Mindon (1853-1878) even helped Muslims to build 
mosques, and also financed the construction of the marina for Burmese 
Muslims in Mecca. Generally, Burmese kings allowed foreigners to 
settle and practise their own religion, but they also intervened if they 
noted a violation of Buddhist law. For this reason, ritual slaughter was 
not acceptable and missionary activity was not possible in Burma26. 
However, contemporary Burmese nationalists use particular examples 
																																								 																				
23 H. Gounger, A Personal Narrative of Two Years' Imprisonment in Burmah, London: John 
Murray, 1860, pp. 96-98. 
24 M. Yegar, The Muslims…, pp. 12-13. 
25 J.P. Leider. ‘Forging Buddhist Credentials as a Toll of Legitimacy and Ethic Identity: A 
Study of Arakan's Subjection in Nineteenth-Century Burma’, Journal of the Economic and 
Social History of the Orient, No. 51, 2008, pp. 409-450.  
26 Ibid., pp. 9-11, 26-28. 
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from history to hold their anti-Islam position27. Some historians argue 
that we can trace the beginning of Burmese national identity based on 
ethnicity and Buddhism to the Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885)28. The 
kingdom and the consequences of its absence are one of the main points 
of reference for the current Buddhist nationalist identity. 
 
Colonial period 
After winning three wars (1826, 1853, 1886), the British occupied 
all of Burma (and also designated its borders, which last to the 
present). By removing the king, the British destroyed the cosmological 
model of the country and overturned the social order. Still, many of 
them were surprised why local people did not treat them as 
liberators29. The question of who could protect Buddhism without 
Dhammaraja was raised. Buddhist monks lost their authority: the 
growth of a European style state educational system took the Burmese 
masses away from their control and they also lost all support from the 
state. Paradoxically, their role started to grow back relatively quickly, 
but in a different context30. 
The first nationalist movement in Burma was led by monks. During 
speeches they called for a boycott and defence against British 
imperialism. Firier sermons circulated throughout all of Burma. “When 
Lord Buddha was alive, man had a predilection for Nirvana. There is 
nothing left now. The reason why it is so is because the government is 
English” 31  said U Ottama (1879-1939) one of the most prominent 
figures of the first wave of Burmese nationalism. Another famous monk, 
U Wisara (1895-1929), died from a hunger strike in a British prison. 
Saya San (1876-1931) went even further by dropping monk robes and 
leading a rebellion against the British regime between 1930-3132. It 
																																								 																				
27  M.J. Walton, S. Hayward, ‘Contesting Buddhist Narratives: Democratization, 
Nationalism, and Communal Violence in Myanmar’, Policy Studies, No. 71, 2014, pp. 20-
23. 
28 Thant Myint-U, The making of modern Burma, Cembridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001, pp. 79-100.  
29 M. Lubina, Birma: centrum kontra peryferie. Kwestia etniczna we współczesnej Birmie 
(1948-2013) [Burma: Center versus Peripheries. The 'Ethnic Question' in Contemporary 
Burma 1948-2013], Kraków: KON-Tekst, 2014, pp. 59-70. 
30 W.M. Charney, A History o Modern Burma, Cambridge: Cambridge University Pressa, 
2009, pp. 5-10. 
31 M.J. Walton, Politics in…, p. 121.  
32 Ibid., pp.15-16.  
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should be noted that the largest nationalist movements were also related 
to Buddhism. The most important were the tantric movements of weiksa 
(wizards), and the vipassana lay meditation movement. Both 
movements emphasised the end of the World Age - especially weiksa, 
which expected the imminent arrival of the future Buddha, Maitreya. In 
both there were voices for the restoration of the monarchy and the old 
moral cosmology. Even the vipassana as a lay movement was conducted 
by monks. Some of the Buddhist clergy were important also for the 
Thakins (the We Burmans Association), who later brought 
independence for Burma - although Marxist influences alongside 
secularist ideas were also visible33. 
During the colonial time, hatred against Islam grew rapidly. First of 
all, the British ruled Burma through Indians and other ethnic minorities. 
From the beginning of their presence, the colonists imported Indians en 
masse to work in the military and government. From the large number 
of incoming workers from India (mostly from Bengal), at least half were 
Muslims34. The Burmese suddenly became the least privileged group in 
their own country – they were excluded economically and linguistically. 
Another dishonour for them was the fact that Burma had been connected 
under the administration to India as its province35. 
The causes of the conflict were not only economic. In 1930 and 1938 
there were two bloody riots targeting immigrants. The second incident 
was directed not so much at the Indians, but specifically at Muslims. 
The pretext for initiating the riots was the publication of a pamphlet 
ridiculing Buddha by an Islamic publicist36, although there were also 
other reasons for the growing hatred for Muslims. 
The case of mixed marriages was very controversial. Muslims 
coming to Burma often took local women as wives. Most of them were 
not considered as full-fledged marriages until the woman converted to 
Islam. In the event of the death of her husband, a widow, if she was not 
a Muslim, faced problems in obtaining the inheritance, and if she was 
																																								 																				
33  I. Jordt, Burma’s Mass Lay Meditation Movement. Buddhism and the Cultural 
Construction of Power, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2007, pp. 21-26, Club du Millénaire, 
Bouddhisme et Politique en Birmanie, entre lutte et domination, http://www.iris-
france.org/docs/kfm_docs/docs/observatoire-religieux/iris-obs-rel---bouddhisme.pdf, 
(accessed: 26.10.2017). 
34 M. Yegar, The Muslims…, op.cit., p. 33. 
35 M. Smith., The Muslim Rohingyas of Burma, Amsterdam: Burma Centrum Nederland, 
1995, p. 23, M. Lubina, Birma: centrum…, pp. 60-68. 
36 W.M. Charney, A History…, p. 48. 
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his rightful wife (rarer cases) she still received much less than according 
to Buddhist tradition. Many Muslims after several years of working in 
Burma returned to India, leaving their partners, whom they did not treat 
as full-fledged wives because they practiced another religion. Both 
intermarriage and the inferior treatment of women by Muslims aroused 
widespread resentment among the Burmese 37 . In 1935, one of the 
authors of the Burmese nationalist press wrote about Muslims: "[they] 
have taken possession of the wealth of the Burmese people and also their 
daughters and sisters"38. Such views at that time were already common, 
and the perception of Muslims as a threat to the Buddhist population 
persists to this day.  
During World War II, hundreds of thousands of Indians left the 
country for fear of repercussions and reprisals by the Burmese -- 
justifiably. The Japanese, who invaded Burma in 1941, used the 
Burmese nationalists to provoke ethnic cleansing, which turned into the 
war in Rakhine. Although nationalists had been trying to organise 
paramilitary organisations before, it was Japan who helped them create 
the Burmese Independence Army39. The army was formed mostly by 
Burmese, often ideologically associated with the nationalist movement 
Dobama Asiayone (We Burmans Association), who received the 
promise of a "free country" 40 . The British supported the Muslim-
dominated North Rakhinse and the Japanese reinforced the Buddhist 
South. Even after the war, the Burmese State did not control the zone 
completely 41 . This war was yet another moment in history which 
contributed to the strengthening of the ethnic identity associated with 
Buddhism.  
The hero of the struggle for independence, Aung San, was also 
accused of the cold-blooded murder of a Muslim village chief. Due to 
his popularity, the British decided not to take him in for trial. Today's 
Muslim community often recalls this incident as evidence that the 
violation of their rights was included from the beginning of 
independence. It should also be noted that many Muslims (though not 
																																								 																				
37 M. Yegar, The Muslims…, pp. 30-37. 
38 Ibidem, p. 36.  
39 M. Lubina, Birma: centrum…, p. 76. 
40 M.P. Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma, New York: Cornell 
University Press 2005, pp. 48-50. 
41 J. Leider, ‘Rohingya: the name, the movement and the quest for identity’. in Nation 
building in Myanmar, Yangon 2013, pp. 239-241. 
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all) during the war remained faithful to the British, which was another 
reason for rising contempt. Burmese followers of the prophet 
Muhammad would be associated largely with the colonial invaders and 
as traitors from there on out42. 
 
Independence period 
General Aung San was murdered before the country achieved 
independence. After his death, the vision of the state as a federation in 
ethnic harmony began to fade. Soon the country plunged into civil war43. 
In the first months of independence, a number of different Muslim 
organisations emerged. Some of them were associated with ethnic 
groups (like Mon Muslims) and often fought for their own national 
interests. For example, a part of the Arakan Muslims fought for their 
own independent state. However, some Muslims declared jihad (holy 
war), like those led by the popular musician Jafar Hussain (Jafar 
Qawwal). Their aim was to create an Islamic state in the west of 
Burma44. Some of them wanted to join Pakistan45. These operations 
assured many Buddhist nationalists in their convictions about Islam. 
Mujahedeen often called themselves “Rohingya” and this was actually 
the first time this name became widespread, with some Muslim 
politicians even using it in the fifties. Using this term they wanted to 
unify Muslims of Chittagonian origin in Northern Rakhine and find a 
connection to Burmese Islamic history 46 . Protests by Buddhist 
nationalists, who see the Rohingya as illegal immigrants from 
Bangladesh and a threat to dhamma, are why until today the Myanmar 
government does not recognise the Rohingya as an official ethnicity.  
The chaotic rule of Prime Minister U Nu and his attempts to establish 
Buddhism as the state religion not only did not improve the situation, 
but strengthened the false division between Buddhist Burmese and non-
Buddhist minorities. In the nation's capital, tensions between the two 
religions occurred constantly47. Sometimes they were violent, as in 1961 
																																								 																				
42 M. Smith., The Muslim…, p. 5-6. 
43 W.M. Charney, A History…, p. 72-78. 
44 G. Defert, Les Rohingya de Birmanie. Arakanais, musulmans et apatrides, Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de Provence, 2007, pp. 229-230, M. Smith., The Muslim…, p. 7. 
45  Thant Myint-U, Myanmar's resurgent nationalism shapes new political landscape, 
https://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Thant-Myint-U/Myanmar-s-resurgent-nationalism-
shapes-new-political-landscape, (accessed: 26.10.2017). 
46 J. Leider, Rohingya…, pp. 240-41. 
47 M. Lubina, Birma: centrum…, p. 104. 
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when armed monks took offence at the building of a new mosque on the 
outskirts of Rangoon. Police had to intervene and the protesters set fire 
to the mosque and surrounding Muslims shops, resulting in a number of 
deaths48. 
It was the army that first stabilised the situation. General Ne Win, 
who was inspired by Marxism49, recalled Aung San's idea of a secular 
state and pursued a policy aimed against his predecessor - Prime 
Minister U Nu. The first years of his regime were welcomed positively 
by many Muslims. Ne Win revoked the banning of ritual slaughter and 
even established the Feast of Sacrifice (Eid al-Adha) as a national 
holiday. In addition, the Burmese government in 1961 signed a ceasefire 
with the Rohingya guerrilla military - today the pact is brought up by 
Muslim activists as proof of recognition of the existence of minorities50. 
Ne Win’s policy was not well received by most of the Buddhist clergy51. 
In response to criticism, the dictator ordered the Buddhist sangha to get 
rid of fake monks52. His general policy was well summed up by his own 
words that "for the Army, it is important to keep the ‘bearded fellows’ 
separate from the ‘bald headed fellows’”53. Lastly, his efforts to turn 
Burma into a socialist paradise failed - mainly for economic reasons. 
The situation of Muslims drastically declined when the new junta of 
General Than Shwe took power after the 1988 mass protests. It had a 
strictly Buddhist nationalist approach. Being Burmese meant being 
Buddhist. Burmanisation in politics become a dominant trend according 
to this idea. Religious minorities were treated as lost sheep who had 
been led astray by foreign powers. The junta launched the operation 
“King of Dhamma”, which meant large-scale buddhisation. National 
radio and television urged people to convert to Buddhism54 . Many 
children from ethnic areas were sent by force to be novices in 
monasteries. In the Kachin State, crosses were removed and in their 
place pagodas were built. In Arakan the same thing happened to many 
																																								 																				
48 M. Smith., The Muslim…, pp 100-104. 
49 Ne Win was strongly against communism although he considers Marxist methods as 
useful. 
50 G. Defert, Les Rohingya de…, p. 148-150, M. Smith., The Muslim…, p. 8. 
51  J. Sisley, ‘La robe et le fusil: le bouddhisme et la dictature militaire en Birmanie’, 
Politique et religion en Asie orientale, Vol. 32, 2001, p. 175.  
52 M. Yegar, The Muslims…, p. 93. 
53 R. Taylor, General Ne Win: A Political Biography, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2015, p. 521. 
54 J. Sisley, La robe et…, pp. 184-190. 
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mosques55. Muslims become the scapegoat of the Than Shwe’s policy. 
The government's proselytism went even so far that in some places for 
converting to Buddhism peasants could get a river buffalo - an animal 
of high value in Burmese rural areas56.  
General Ne Win had tried to keep religion away from public affairs 
– during the reign of the new junta it was the opposite. More important 
abbots and monks received political voices, including monks with a 
radically anti-Islamic point of view. In this period, the 969 Movement 
was born. 
 
The 969 Movement and MaBaTha 
The movement was established in 1990 and was probably inspired 
by a book by U Kyaw Lwin, who used the number 969 as 
cosmologically stronger than 786 - the number of Southeast Asian 
Muslims which indicated their business properties. 786 represented the 
phrase: "In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate and Merciful", while 
969 was connected to "three jewels of Buddhism”: the nine attributes of 
the Buddha, the six attributes of dhamma, and the nine attributes of the 
sangha57. As a movement 969 was decentralised. The followers, both 
lay people and monks, raised voices similar to those from the thirties - 
they accused Muslims of having economic privileges, abusing women, 
and fast, uncontrolled population growth58.  
On January 2014 U Wirathu, along with other prominent monks in 
Mandalay, launched the “Organisation for the Protection of Race, 
Religion, and Belief”, abbreviated as MaBaTha (an acronym). 
According to one member, “Forming this association makes us stronger, 
as if we have built a fortress in Upper Myanmar which people from 
different religions won’t be able to destroy,”59. Many members of the 
969 movement were absorbed by the MaBaTa. The organisation not 
only campaigned against Muslims, but also successfully lobbied in the 
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government for a series of controversial laws to protect Buddhism. For 
example, one law required Buddhist women to register if they intended 
to marry non-Buddhists60. Even though nationalist monks claimed that 
they did not support any single politician or political party, their 
agitation could be treated as the fifth column of the junta. Even after the 
2015 election when the National League for Democracy (NLD) won 
significantly and obtained a majority of the total seats (235 in the House 
of Representatives and 135 in the House of Nationalities) the MaBaTha 
has remained a powerful and influential organization.  
Above all, the movement see Muslims as a threat to the development 
of Buddhism in Burma. Their views are reflected in a song entitled: We 
will fence our nation with our bones, which was played during their 
rallies: 
“Buddha’s Wisdom shines over our land 
In the defence of the Bama race and the Buddhist faith we will stand 
at the front line. 
These people [the infidels/Muslims] live on our [Buddhist] soil. 
They drink our water. 
They break our rules. 
They suck our wealth. 
And they insult us the host. 
They destroy our youth. 
Alas, they are just ungrateful, worthless creatures”61. 
In the Buddhist nationalist’s worldview, religion is strictly 
connected with Burmese national identity. The ethnic identification is 
built on the opposition to Islam. Identity based on the opposition was 
characteristic for the Dobama movement during the pre-independence 
time. They focused primarily on the rejection of British and Indian 
patterns. Then, Buddhism did not play such a big role (still Marxist 
ideology was present), but minorities were excluded, for cultural 
betrayal and collaboration62. Similar to Dobama, 969 (and from 2014 
the MaBaTha), is a broad-based social movement created as a response 
to the uncertainty of fast changes. For both Dobama and the MaBaTha, 
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the main enemy is from abroad and is trying to destroy the uniqueness 
of being Burmese. The nationalist monk U Wirathu, an example of a 
leading Islamophobic voice in Myanmar, accused Muslims for the 
sanctions the US imposed on Burma because he suspected the presence 
of Al-Qaeda in the country63. When Dobama was calling for a rejection 
of British clothes and food64, U Wirathu urged a boycott of Muslim 
products and stores and promoting a “Buy Buddhist” campaign 65 . 
Dobama as a social movement received massive support from the 
Burmese and even the colonial government decided to tolerate its 
activism66. Even after being imprisoned for several years for his hate-
filled sermons,67 U Wirathu did not lose his influence, and the incident 
rather increased his legend. After his release in 2012, he received 
support from government officials who were trying to use him for their 
political gains. In response to a “Times” article about violent Buddhism 
in Myanmar, even president Thein Sein replied that the 969 movement 
"is just a symbol of peace" and Wirathu is "a son of Lord Buddha"68.  
 Many Buddhist nationalists, including U Wirathu, who was called 
the "Militant Monk" by his supporters and once called himself a 
Buddhist bin Laden69, condemn violence. Although the 969 pamphlets 
reject violence70, they seem to legitimise it at the same time. It seems 
that the defence of dhamma and sasana stands above all else. Monks 
connected to the MaBaTha use several arguments according to Buddhist 
tradition to support their view. In one story, Buddha in his past life killed 
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a man. He saw that the man would kill 500 people in the future, so 
killing him was an act of compassion and choice of a lesser evil. In the 
eyes of the nationalist monks, it looks like the perfect excuse. If they 
apply some kind of violence, it is only because it will prevent even more 
evil. In one of his speeches, U Wirathu quoted texts from the Kālacakra 
Laghutantra, which was rather strange, because it comes from a 
different tradition - Vajrayana Buddhism. The prophecy for the victory 
of Buddhism in a war with Islam which Kālacakra contained fitted well 
with U Wirathu's political view 71 . The common argument is that 
Buddhism disappears from the world because of Islam and countries 
like Afghanistan, Indonesia or Bangladesh were Buddhist in the past72.  
Since the nineties, the conflict has turned violent many times. In 
1997, due to rumours about a rape by a Muslim, the country was swept 
up by protests. In Mandalay, 18 mosques were torched and many houses 
that belonged to Muslims were destroyed. In the streets, violent mobs 
led by monks burned the Quran and preached anti-Islamic words73. In 
2001 there were more violent riots in Taungoo caused by the destruction 
of Buddhist statues in Bamiyan by the Taliban. In response to this, a 
mob led by Buddhist monks destroyed a historic mosque in Taungoo. 
Protests covered the whole region; once again, there were suspicions 
that the riot might have been controlled by the junta as the monks had 
radios, normally available only for uniformed services74. In 2012 several 
riots erupted in Rakhine after the rape and murder of an ethnic Rakhine 
woman. As a result, at least 166 Muslims and Rakhine were killed and 
tensions grow across the country. U Wirathu and other radical 
nationalists have been partly responsible for increasing tensions, while 
on the wave of the political thaw they saw an opportunity to speak more 
freely. In 2013 anti-Islamic incidents and violence occurred almost in 
every big city in Myanmar. Often riots were provoked by rumours e.g. 
in 1 July 2014 two people were killed in Mandalay after information 
about the raping of a Buddhist woman which appeared on U Wirathu' 
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Facebook profile75. As a result of prolonged conflict and persecution 
almost a half million Rohingya fled the country in September 2017. This 
is twice as many as in 197876 and it shows how bad the situation is 
currently.  
Despite the commitment of some world figures of Buddhism to urge 
Burmese Buddhists to end Islamophobia, including both the Dalai Lama 
and Thich Nhat Hanh, the attitude of the MaBaTha and Buddhist 
nationalists receive support from countries like Thailand and Sri Lanka. 
In the latter case, we notice the emergence of groups very similar to 969, 
such as Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist power group)77. Also it must be 
noticed that the Dalai Lama and Thich Nhat Hanh are very pro-western 
Buddhist teachers. The Buddhist world is divided on the case of 
Myanmar. In the country, the methods of U Wirathu were condemned 
by some important abbots from the Burmese sangha, but it is also 
difficult to see unequivocal evidence. The conviction that there is a 
threat from Islam is widespread. One of the most well known Burmese 
monks, the Venerable Sitagu Sayadaw, condemned violent methods, but 
in the same speech he also stressed that, “we, the East Asian Buddhist 
countries are living in constant daily fear of falling under the sword of 
the Islamic extremists. As we are lacking power and influence, we 
cannot compete against with the rapid growth of the Islamic world.” He 
also referred to the Rohingya: “In 1948-49, by the name of Mujtahid, 
those illegal immigrants revolted against the Burmese army. Their 
intention was to establish a separate Muslim state. The Burmese army 
had to confront the Islamic Mujahedeen. Today, they neither call 
themselves Bengalis nor Mujahedeen. But, calling themselves 
Rohingyas, they are trying to demand a separate homeland. They also 
burned their houses by themselves as if it was done by Burmese 
Buddhists”78. These words of one of the greatest moral authorities in the 
country show perfectly how Buddhist nationalism is strong in Myanmar 
today.  
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Conclusions and further prognosis 
The removal of the King by the British led to the collapse of the 
Buddhist state and cosmology. This resulted in a trauma, the 
consequences of which are felt to this day. As indicated, Buddhism is 
intimately linked with politics and a secular vision of the country is by 
definition at odds with the one presented by religion. It should come as 
no surprise that monks pressure leading politicians to stand up in 
defence of Buddhism and dhamma - in other words - to take the attitude 
of dhammaraja.  
Broad-based social movements like 969 and the MaBaTha are not 
centralised and are easy to characterise. Their activists can be classified 
as Buddhist nationalists, but also they differ from each other e.g. not all 
of them are supporters of U Wirathu, and many condemn any acts of 
violence. In a context of fast societal change, Buddhist nationalism is 
seeking to strengthen national identity and giving society a common 
enemy - due to historical circumstances and particularly Islam. It is an 
especially attractive scapegoat for those who have not managed to 
improve their status during the current economic changes and also for 
the government to divert attention from other problems. Similarly, like 
Dobama in the past, the MaBaTha gets widespread endorsement from 
most of the Burmese. This support is especially present online through 
social media like Facebook79. Paradoxically, the popularity of the group 
could rise on the wave of reforms from 2010 giving greater freedom to 
the media, the press, and the associations.  
Despite that in July 2016 when there were two mob attacks on 
Muslims communities and Aung San Suu Kyi's government threatened 
the MaBaTha using legal action against them for hate speech, the leader 
of the National League for Democracy remained silent and ambiguous. 
This attitude is responsible from a political perspective. If she 
denounces an army intervention on the Rohingya in Rakhine state, she 
could lose not only her social support, but also the generals could 
threaten her power80. The current government in the same manner as the 
junta befire it has refused to give the Rohingya right to be a legitimate 
minority and identified them as "immigrants from Bangladesh" despite 
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that meaning they would have been illegal immigrants for at least a 
hundred years. The presence of armed groups like the Arakan Rohingya 
Salvation Army in the region also works against the Rohingya case and 
the image of Muslims in Myanmar. It is also important to notice that 
some members of the National League for Democracy are supporters of 
the MaBaTha – in 2015 the party even refused to field any Muslim 
candidates81.  
It is hard to predict U-Wirathu’s future career, but it can be assumed 
that Buddhist nationalism’s impact on politics and its fight with Islam 
will not decrease in the coming years. Social instability, the 
disappointment with the democratic system and economic changes, 
uncertainty about the future and the growing separation of conflicting 
groups will continue to serve radical voices and polarities. There is also 
the risk that, with the rise of religious and ethnic tensions the army will 
carry out another coup and recover full power.  
Buddhist nationalism still will play an important role between the 
NLD and the generals’ political game and it is important to not overlook 
the phenomenon of Buddhist nationalism. 
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